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Abstract 
Consumers voluntarily pay signiﬁcant price premiums to acquire unobservable environmental attributes in green 
markets. This paper considers the performance of eco-certiﬁcation policy under circumstances where consumers cannot 
discern environmental attributes in goods, but are able to form rational expectations regarding the extent of illicit activities 
in the green market. The main results are: (i) fraud is less prevalent in green markets when entry barriers limit the number 
of ﬁrms; (ii) conventional environmental policies on polluting techniques increase the incidence of fraud, and can even 
preclude the use of non-polluting techniques which would otherwise emerge in green markets; (iii) voluntary eco­
certiﬁcation policies can decrease fraud, increase output, and raise proﬁts per ﬁrm; and (iv) in cases where the socially 
optimal resource allocation can be supported, the optimal policy involves negative unit certiﬁcation fees, positive ﬁxed 
certiﬁcation fees and is revenue-generating for the certifying agent. 
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1. Introduction 
Markets for environmentally-friendly goods and services are becoming increasingly common. Eco­
certiﬁcation programs now govern the sale of thousands of products in more than 20 countries [18,27] and 
green products account for approximately 9% of all new-product introductions in the United States [13]. 
Consumers pay signiﬁcant price premiums for organic foods, for ‘‘green electricity’’, for shade-grown and fair-
trade coffee, and for various environmental attributes such as sustainable, recycled, non-toxic, biodegradable, 
and cruelty-free. One reason why consumers buy environmentally-friendly versions of products instead of 
cheaper, but otherwise equivalent versions is that consuming products that contain environmental attributes is 
gratifying. Consumers prefer environmental attributes in their products much like they prefer any other 
desirable product quality attribute in market goods. 
Green markets for environmental attributes are nevertheless different from other markets where product 
quality attributes are exchanged in two essential ways. First, consumer preferences for environmental 
attributes often depend on an aspect of production technology, for instance an inverse measure of pollution 
emissions, and this need not relate to any fungible consumptive qualities of the good. Unlike product quality 
attributes such as appearance, ﬂavor and durability, which are generally revealed either pre-purchase or post-
purchase, environmental attributes may never be perceived at all. This creates an opportunity for fraud in 
green markets that motivates third-party certiﬁcation.1 Second, the products exchanged in green markets are 
frequently unbranded, as when fruit and vegetables from different producers are sold under a common organic 
label. This makes collective reputation issues important in green markets. 
This paper examines the performance of eco-certiﬁcation policy in green markets with the potential for 
fraud. There are three key elements of the analysis: (i) consumer willingness-to-pay premiums exist for 
environmentally-friendly products; (ii) certiﬁcation policy agglomerates ﬁrms in quality space under a 
common eco-label; and (iii) consumers are unable to discern environmental attributes in products, but can 
nonetheless form rational expectations regarding the overall extent of fraud in the market. 
Considerable evidence exists that fraud indeed occurs in green markets. The use of misrepresentative labels 
has been documented for ‘‘GMO-free’’ foods [3], for ‘‘ecoﬁsh’’ and ‘‘antibiotic-free’’ meats [7], and a number 
of ﬁrms have faced criminal prosecution for engaging in fraudulent sales of conventional products as organic 
(see, e.g., [8,10,14,23]).2 Information often also exists for consumers to form inferences on the overall quality 
of environmental attributes traded in green markets. A 1997 study by Consumer Reports detected traces of 
synthetic pesticides on 25% of organically-labeled tomatoes, peaches, green bell peppers, and apples [4], and 
the Seattle Post-Intelligencer recently reported a mix of 4–5% ordinary ﬁsh with environmentally sound 
seafood under a retailer’s ‘‘ecoﬁsh’’ label [7]. 
Our analysis of fraud in green markets is framed by a vertical differentiated market structure in which a 
conventional good and an eco-friendly good differ according to a single, unobserved production attribute. 
This structure, which follows Mussa and Rosen [16], has several precursors in the literature on environmental 
quality provision under oligopoly. Ronnen [20] and Crampes and Hollander [5] consider minimum quality 
standards with a single low-quality ﬁrm and a single high-quality ﬁrm. A minimum quality standard, which 
forces the low-quality ﬁrm upwards in quality space, reduces the extent of product differentiation in the 
market, and this leads to pro-competitive effects. Amacher et al. [1] extend this framework to consider a 
technology investment stage. As is the case under a minimum quality standard, eco-certiﬁcation policy 
generates socially beneﬁcial effects by reducing product differentiation, which occurs when the low-quality 
ﬁrm is more efﬁcient at investing than the high-quality ﬁrm. Here, we depart from this structure to consider 
two vertically differentiated markets—a ‘‘brown’’ market and a ‘‘green’’ market—each of which is comprised 
of multiple ﬁrms. Moreover, because our main focus is on collective reputation and fraud in the green market, 
we suppress the usual strategic duopoly interaction in vertical differentiation models by considering perfect 
competition among ﬁrms in the brown market. 
The model also relates to the literature on common traits (see, e.g., [2,26,15]). In these models, collective 
reputation develops among members of a group and becomes a public good. Unobserved shocks generate 
informational externalities among members of the group, but these externalities disappear over time as the 
common trait is learned. That is, individuals develop reputations. The present paper relates to this literature in 
the sense that ﬁrms sharing a common eco-label develop a collective reputation; however, the element of 
individual reputation is notably absent. This is because ﬁrm-speciﬁc information is never revealed to 
consumers, even through repeated purchase.3 
1Eco-certiﬁcation is an important aspect of green markets, and eco-labels such as the German ‘‘Blue Angel’’, the U.S. ‘‘Green Seal’’ and 
the Nordic Council ‘‘White Swan’’ encompass broad categories of goods. Other signiﬁcant eco-certiﬁcation programs exist for individual 
products, such as ‘‘USDA Certiﬁed Organic’’. 
2The founder of the nonproﬁt certiﬁcation organization Certiﬁed Naturally Grown (CNG) states it thus: ‘‘a surprising number of 
USDA certiﬁed organic growers use prohibited substances on their own farms in an emergency, (and) other USDA organic growers do 
everything right on their own farms, but on the way to market stop by and ‘top off’ the truck with produce from a conventional farm’’ [24]. 
3This parallels the distinction made in the literature between experience goods and credence goods. For experience goods, revelation of 
quality attributes occurs through repeated purchase, whereas, for credence goods, both pre-purchase and post-purchase costs of 
determining whether or not an attribute truly exists are high (see, e.g., [6,22,19]). 
We study both an oligopoly structure with an exogenous number of ﬁrms and a monopolistically 
competitive equilibrium in the green market. Our results relate to product ‘‘purity’’, which we deﬁne as an 
inverse measure of fraud in the green market. The main ﬁndings of the paper can be summarized as follows. 
First, industrial structure has an important inﬂuence on purity in green markets. When the number of ﬁrms 
serving the green market is ‘‘small’’, individual incentives to free-ride on the collective reputation of the eco­
label are tempered, and this facilitates the provision of product purity. As in [12], there is an interesting policy 
tension between non-compliance (impurity) and market power. Second, eco-certiﬁcation costs generally have 
desirable effects on green market performance. Under oligopoly, unit certiﬁcation costs raise both purity and 
proﬁts per ﬁrm in the green market, and thus provide a motive for voluntary compliance that does not rely on 
individual reputation. Under monopolistic competition, ﬁxed certiﬁcation costs serve as a barrier to entry in 
green markets, but higher ﬁxed costs nevertheless tends to increase output and purity. Third, traditional 
environmental policies that tax brown techniques and subsidize green ones increase the incidence of fraud. 
Indeed, the traditional policy approach causes equilibrium fraud to emerge in green markets under 
circumstances where it otherwise would not. Fourth, an eco-certiﬁcation policy involving a combination of 
ﬁxed certiﬁcation charges and per unit certiﬁcation fees has the potential to achieve the socially optimal 
resource allocation. For parameterizations of the model for which this is feasible, the optimal policy involves 
negative unit certiﬁcation fees, positive ﬁxed certiﬁcation fees and is revenue-generating for the certifying 
agent. Finally, when fraud detection is endogenous, monitoring and enforcement activities can deter illicit 
activities, but are no more effective in eliminating fraud than eco-certiﬁcation policies which do not involve 
any monitoring and enforcement at all. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates a model of consumer demand in green markets. 
Section 3 characterizes the social optimum. Section 4 considers the oligopoly and monopolistically competitive 
equilibria in the green market under various combinations of environmental regulations and eco-certiﬁcation 
policies. Section 5 examines monitoring and enforcement strategies and Section 6 concludes. 
2. The model 
Consider a market with two technologies (polluting and non-polluting) and two goods. The goods are 
comprised of an identical set of consumptive characteristics, but differ according to a single environmental 
attribute linked to the technology choice. Throughout, the good produced with the non-polluting technology 
is denoted yg and referred to as the green product, and the good produced with the polluting technology is 
denoted yb and referred to as the brown product. At equal prices, all consumers prefer green products to 
brown ones; however, consumers are heterogeneous and vary in their preference for the environmental 
attribute.4 
Production technology is unobservable in consumption, and this implies that brown products can work 
their way into the green market. Let yf denote the quantity of fraudulently-labeled brown products disguised 
for sale as green products. There are thus three types of production (yb, yf, and yg) and only two markets. To 
reconcile production with sales, let y^b denote total sales in the brown market and let y^ denote total sales in the g 
green market. 
The model is framed as follows. Fraud is possible in the green market, because the production technology 
used to produce the green good is not veriﬁed in consumption; however, the extent of fraud is bounded, 
because consumers are able to form rational expectations about the degree of illicit activities in the market. 
Consumers can form their beliefs in numerous ways, for instance by exposure to media citing labeling 
violations, by observing various environmental indicators related to pollution or land use, or by common 
knowledge of the structure of the game. We assume consumer beliefs, on average, are correct. 
Consumer preferences for the green product depend on the objective probability that a randomly chosen 
sample from the green market results in the selection of a true green good. Throughout, this objective 
probability is referred to as the purity of the environmental attribute. If all products sold in the green market 
are in fact fraudulently-labeled brown products, then the environmental attribute has zero purity in the green 
4Green products may be desired for reasons of both personal health and environmental health, and can jointly provide both private and 
public goods (see [11]). 
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market, and consumer demand goes to zero. Otherwise, demand in the green market is positive and increasing 
in purity. 
To focus attention on behavior in green markets, we assume the brown good is produced by a competitive 
industry at a constant unit cost of cb.
5 Production of the brown good generates pollution, and this creates 
environmental harm according to the damage function e ¼ e(yb), where e0(.)40 and e00(.)40. 
Production of the green product does not damage the environment. Green production involves a common 
component of cost with brown production and an additional cost of creating the environmental attribute. 
Namely, let cgðy Þ ¼ cby þ cðy Þ denote total cost for producing the green product, where c(.), theg g g
environmental attribute cost function, satisﬁes c0(.)40 and c00(.)X0. One interpretation of c(.) is pollution 
abatement cost. Another interpretation is productivity loss when ‘‘brown inputs’’ are not employed (e.g., the 
loss of organic crops due to pests). 
Firms in the green market can either produce the green product or produce the brown product and disguise 
it for sale as green. Let d represent unit disguise costs. We conﬁne our attention to circumstances in which 
crime at least has the potential to pay, and this implies that the production of brown goods disguised as green 
ones is less costly on the margin than the production of truly green goods; that is, c0ðy Þ4d holds ing
equilibrium. 
The green market equilibrium studied below is the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in true green 
production, yg, and fraud, yf. We study only symmetric equilibria. Let n denote the number of ﬁrms in the 
green market. The symmetric equilibrium which takes as given the number of ﬁrms is called the oligopoly 
equilibrium, and the speciﬁcation in which free entry and exit are allowed in the green market is referred to as 
the monopolistic competition equilibrium. 
Suppose for the moment that neither consumers nor the certifying agent engage in monitoring and 
yb ¼ 
y^
enforcement activities. In this event, attempts at fraudulent sales always succeed, and it follows that
yb � yf and ¼ y þ yf . Consequently, purity in the green market is given by g g 
y yg gr ¼ ¼ . 
y^ þ yfyg g 
Consumers choose between three types of goods: an outside good (the numeraire), and two inside goods 
(the brown good and the green good). Consumers are heterogeneous, and differ according to their demand for 
product quality. Product quality, q, is comprised of a bundle of observable consumptive qualities, k, which are 
held in common by brown and green products, and an additional environmental attribute in the green 
product, which exists (on average) in the green market with a purity level of r. For simplicity, these 
characteristics are assumed to be additively separable, so that qðk; rÞ ¼ cðkÞ þ r. Consumers differ in their 
preferences for the product according to a taste parameter, y, which is assumed to be continuously indexed 
and uniformly distributed over the unit interval. Finally, each consumer has exogenous income of m. 
Let pb and pg denote the market prices of the brown product and the green product, respectively. The 
indirect utility of a type-y consumer who buys good i with quality level k and purity level r is given by 
Viðpi; k; r; yÞ ¼ m � pi þ y cðkÞ þ rÞð for i ¼ b; g, 
where r ¼ 0 in the case of the brown good. 
Market demands are determined from two critical values of the taste distribution. The preference level of 
the consumer who is indifferent between purchasing green and brown goods, y ¼ y ðpb; p ; rÞ, is found by g g g
setting m � p þ ygðcðkÞ þ rÞ ¼ m � pb þ ygcðkÞ and solving for yg. Doing so yields y ¼ ðp � pbÞ=r. Allg g g 
consumers with values of y that satisfy yXy purchase the green product and the remaining consumers g 
purchase either the brown product or the outside good. The preference level of the consumer who is indifferent 
between purchasing the brown good and the outside good, yb ¼ ybðpb; kÞ, is found by setting m � pb þ
ybcðkÞ ¼ m and solving for yb. This gives yb ¼ pb =cðkÞ. 
5Fixed costs may also exist to produce brown goods. However, because the goal of the present paper is to examine behavior in the green 
market, these ﬁxed costs are suppressed. Thus, we implicitly conceive the brown industry to be in a long-run competitive equilibrium with 
marginal cost and average cost equal to cb for the representative ﬁrm. 
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Normalizing the number of consumers to one, demand for the brown good and the green good is deﬁned 
from y and y , respectively, in the case of full market coverage as b g
cðkÞpg � ðcðkÞ þ rÞpb
Dbðpb; p ; rÞ ¼ y � yb ¼ , (1)g g rcðkÞ 
r � p þ pb� g 6ðpb; p ; rÞ ¼ 1 � y ¼ . (2)Dg g g r 
One possibility in the green market equilibrium is that cost of producing the green attribute is so high that 
consumers have zero demand for the green attribute, even when it is sold at marginal cost. To ensure that 
demand for the premium product in Eq. (2) is strictly positive when a product with unit purity (r ¼ 1) is sold 
at marginal cost, we assume 
0 �1 � c y 40, (3)g 
^^
where yg is the equilibrium quality produced by the representative ﬁrm. For values of marginal attribute cost, 
c0(.), that violate condition (3), a green market does not exist. 
yb and Dg yMaking use of the deﬁnition of sales in each market, Dbðpb; p , demand Eqs. ; rÞ ¼ ðpb; pg; rÞ ¼g g
(1) and (2) can be inverted to yield 
yb; y^^ (4)pbð gÞ ¼ cðkÞ 1 � yb � yg , ^^
^yb; y y
Notice that the derived demand for the environmental attribute sold in the green market is proportional to 
^^ g; rÞ ¼ cðkÞ 1 � yb � yg ^^ 1 � (5)ð þ rp .g g 
y^gÞ. That is, if the equilibrium price of the brown good is p¯b, inverse demand its purity level, pg � pb ¼ rð1 �
for the green good is 
y^ y^
Demand for the environmental attribute in Eq. (6) depends on total output and purity in the green market. 
At zero purity, the environmental attribute no longer trades in the green market, and inverse demand for the 
green good in Eq. (6) becomes horizontal at price p¯b. 
3. The social optimum 
1 � (6)¼ p¯b þ rp¯b; ; rp .g g g 
^y^b; y ; rg to 
maximize net consumptive beneﬁts, given the number of ﬁrms which operate in the market (n). Under 
Under oligopoly, the social problem is expressed as the selection of an output-purity triple f g
monopolistic competition, the socially optimal resource allocation also considers the efﬁcient distribution of 
y^
, the total social cost of ^^^^
output across ﬁrms. The production level of a representative ﬁrm in the green market is given by yi;g ¼ r
y y yb þ ð1 � rÞy
=n,g 
and, making use of the identities yf ¼ ð1 � rÞ and yb ¼¼ r, yg g g g
^^
production can be written as 
yb; y ^^^y^ y yb þ ð1 � rÞy
At the socially optimal levels of production, y and y , there are two possibilities regarding the marginal b g
cost of the green attribute: either (i) c0ðygÞpc0ðybÞ, in which case the socially optimal resource allocation 
forecloses the brown market; or (ii) c0ðybÞoc0ðygÞ, in which case brown products cost less on the social margin 
6In the case where market coverage is incomplete, the markets for brown and green products would essentially operate as independent 
markets. With a competitive brown market, the usual differences in strategic effects that emerge under the various circumstances of 
covered and uncovered markets do not occur here, and the effect of incomplete coverage would inﬂuence the outcome in precisely the same 
way as setting pb ¼ 0 in the model. 
y^b þ ½cb þ dð1 � rÞ� (7)C ¼ cb þ nc þ e; r; n r =n .g g g g 
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green products, and the optimal resource allocation potentially involves serving both markets. Attention is 
conﬁned to the latter case. Speciﬁcally, we assume it is cheaper on the margin to produce and disguise brown 
goods as green ones than it is to produce truly green goods: 
0 � 0 � c y þ doc y . (8)b g 
Aggregate welfare is given by Z Z
y yb; x; rÞdx � C yb; y
where total social cost is given by (7). 
Under oligopoly, the social optimum satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions 
yb; y
^^^
y^
^
^^
yb 
W ¼ pbðx;
^ g 
Þdx þ ð ; r; np ,g g g
0 0 
"
0# $¼ cb þ e yb , (9)pb g 
; r
"
¼ cb þ rc 0
! 
y =n 
"
þ ð1 � rÞ#d þ e 0ðybÞ$, (10)gg yb; yg^^p Z qpg yb; x; r 
Eqs. (9) and (10) are standard welfare condition that set price equal to marginal social cost in each market. 
The marginal social cost of producing the green product to a purity standard of r is 
cb þ rc0ð:Þ þ ð1 � rÞðd þ e0ð:ÞÞ, and this is equated with the green market price in Eq. (10). Expression (11) is 
the Kuhn–Tucker condition on optimal purity. In markets with an element of impurity (r *o1), it is possible to 
increase product purity only by replacing brown goods with green goods: The marginal beneﬁt of doing so is 
^y^1 
y^
g 0ðy =nÞ þ d þ e 0ðybÞX0;gS � ð1 � rÞS ¼ 0.dx � c (11) qrg 0 
Z
yb; x; rÞ
g 0 
and the marginal social cost of doing so is c0ð:Þ � d � e0ð:Þ.7 
In the free-entry equilibrium, the social optimum satisﬁes Eqs. (9)–(11) and 
^
y^
y^
1 g 
dx,ð =qrqpg
cðyg =nÞ � ry^gc 0ðy =nÞ=n ¼ 0. (12)g 
^^^
Eq. (12) ensures the representative ﬁrm acquires minimum efﬁcient scale in the market. 
Notice that the social optimum involves a trade-off in the allocation of purity. A degree of impurity (r *o1) 
decreases the surplus acquired by each consumer in the green market in Eq. (11), but reduced purity also 
lowers cost, driving down the premium price in Eq. (10) and making green products accessible to a greater 
number of consumers. Because demand in Eq. (6) is linear in purity and the marginal cost of producing green 
^
products is separable in the environmental attribute (and bounded by condition (8)), increasing purity always 
produces a net social beneﬁt. We arrive at (proofs of all propositions are located in the appendix):8 
Proposition 1. With separable attribute cost and linear demand for purity, the socially optimal resource 
allocation involves unit purity in the green market, r * ¼ 1. 
The socially optimal resource allocation (r * ¼ 1) reconciles production and consumption in each market, 
y y y yb ¼ y � � 0 � 0and , and involves prices set at marginal cost, p and p The¼ y ¼ cb þ e ¼ cb þ c .bb bg g g g 
^
^
^
^
^
premium price in the green market is equal to the increment in marginal social cost, 
y y 
y y y 
� � 0 0 40, and, in the free-entry case, green production is diversiﬁed to minimize industry � p ¼ c � ep bbg g 
0¼ ccosts, nc =n = =n .g g g 
7Disguise costs are necessary in the social optimum to prevent consumers from engaging in the individually optimal behavior of sorting 
among green products for true green units. 
8In general, impurity can be optimal in green markets if the distribution of y is non-uniform. 
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4. Environmental policy and eco-certiﬁcation 
This section considers the effects of both environmental policy and third party eco-certiﬁcation on the 
market equilibrium. In practice, most third party eco-certiﬁcation policies are combined with some form of 
monitoring, at least at an auditing level, and penalties are assessed for non-compliance, for instance the 
removal of fraudulent output from the market. Nonetheless, eco-certiﬁcation costs alone, absent monitoring 
and enforcement, have interesting effects on the green market equilibrium. These effects are considered here. 
Eco-certiﬁcation policies may involve both ﬁxed costs and variable costs. For example, unit licensing and 
inspection fees may be combined with ﬁxed application and auditing costs.9 Let f denote per unit eco­
certiﬁcation costs and F denote ﬁxed eco-certiﬁcation costs in the green market.10 
We also consider the possibility that environmental policy exists to internalize pollution costs in the brown 
market. To align private and social incentives for brown production (see Eq. (9)), efﬁcient policy would 
0 �require the equivalent of an environmental tax set at the level of marginal damage, t ¼ e y , in the brown b 
market. 
¼Pyig ¼ yig 
and r ¼P^ ^^
^^
denote the output sold by ﬁrm in the green market,þ iy y yfi ig 
^
y denote product purity. Firm i’s problem is to select yig and yif to maximize proﬁts, 
sig yig y
y^
^
Let denote industry output, ig 
=iyig g 
y^ Þ � cb � f yig � dyif � c yigp¯b þ rð1 �¼ þ yif � F .; yif ; ; rpi yig g g
Denoting the market share of ﬁrm i in the green market as , the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions ¼ = g
for a maximum can be written 
y^Fif � p¯b þ r � cb � f � dp0; yif Fif ¼ 0;sig 
þ ð1 � rÞ
^1 � (13)� rg 
0 ^^^^y sig sigy y p0;^
11where all values are expressed in terms of market share and purity. Expression (13) gives the optimality 
condition on fraud. Fraudulent production reduces the premium price in two ways. A marginal increase in 
fraudulent output increases output in the green market, which reduces the premium price by , and the �r
Fig � cb � f � c Fig1 � ¼ 0; (14)� p¯b þ r r =n yigg g g 
^y^ y
, and this reduces marginal revenue for the representative ﬁrm 
additional unit of fraud also dilutes market purity, further reducing the premium price by �rð1 � . In Þ=g g
y^
In Eq. (13), the representative ﬁrm engages in fraud as long the marginal private beneﬁt of 
net, a unit of fraud is valued in price as �r= g
^^
sig. 
fraudulent production, p¯b þ rð1 � y sig 
Expression (14) gives the necessary condition for production of green goods. An additional green unit 
^by �r
þ cb þ f þ d.Þ, exceeds its marginal private cost, rg
increases sales in the green market, which reduces the premium price by �r, but also increases purity, which 
^y^ y
� 1, and this augments ﬁrm proﬁts by y^
raises the premium price by ð1 � rÞ ð1 �
^^
The net effect on price of an additional green unit is 
y sig. 
Þ= .g g
ð1 � rÞ ð1 � rÞ � The representative ﬁrm produces truly = g g 
^
^
y^
sig
private cost, cb þ f þ c0ð:Þ. 
If an environmental tax is imposed in the brown industry at the Pigovian level, the competitive equilibrium 
price of the brown good is p¯b ¼ cb þ t, where t ¼ e0ðy
these expressions in the symmetric case, sig ¼ 1=n, gives 
^þ ð1 � rÞ � yg ggreen output as long as the marginal private beneﬁt of doing so, p , exceeds the marginal 
Þ. Substituting this into (13) and (14), and evaluating b
%
n � 1 & 
Ff ¼ r � t � dp0; yf Ff ¼ 0; (15)gn 
9To meet USDA National Organic Program (NOP) standards, mixed operations producing both organic and non-organic products 
generally incur inspection and certiﬁcation costs which vary with output, pay a ﬁxed application fee, and maintain an audit trail by keeping 
separate accounting records for organic and non-organic operations. 
10Eco-certiﬁcation costs have been treated in the literature both as variable costs [9,25] and as ﬁxed costs [1]. 
11It is straightforward to verify that the reaction functions slope downward and demand crosses marginal cost from above in the green 
market, which is sufﬁcient for existence and stability of the Cournot–Nash equilibrium (see [17]). 
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p0; 1 �n � 1 g 0Fg Fg ¼ 0. (16)¼ r � þ � t � c r =n yg g gn n 
where t ¼ f � t. Notice that an environmental tax on the brown good and a subsidy on the green good (fo0) 
produce isomorphic effects in the green market. This is because, with constant unit costs in the brown 
industry, the environmental tax is passed through entirely into price, raising the base price for both goods. 
The symmetric, monopolistically competitive equilibrium is determined by these two equations, and the 
free-entry condition which states that proﬁts are zero. This equation, which makes n an endogenous variable, 
is given by " 
¼ n F  þ cðry y y
In both the no-entry and free-entry settings, the symmetric, pure strategy oligopoly equilibrium takes one of 
three forms. Throughout, we refer to a region I outcome as an equilibrium in which unit purity is provided, a 
region II outcome as an equilibrium in which impure green products are provided, and a region III outcome as 
an equilibrium in which zero purity is provided and green market foreclosure occurs. 
We address three questions for eco-certiﬁcation policy: (i) What are the effects on output, prices and purity 
within each region? (ii) Does eco-certiﬁcation policy alter the boundaries between regions? And (iii) what are 
the resulting welfare implications? 
^
Consider ﬁrst the effect of eco-certiﬁcation costs and pollution control policy on the boundaries between 
regions under oligopoly. For a region I outcome with unit purity ðr� ¼ 1Þ, ðFf o0Þ in Eq. (15), and Fg ¼ 0 in 
Eq. (16). Making use of (16) in (15), a region I outcome occurs when 
1 þ nt %n þ 1& 
c 0ð:Þo þ d.
2n n 
For a region II outcome with an element of impurity (0or *o1) in the market, an interior solution is 
obtained in Eq. (15) and (16) with Ff ¼ 0 and Fg ¼ 0. Solving these equations simultaneously, a region II 
outcome occurs when 
1 þ nt %n þ 1& 1 þ dpc 0ð:Þp þ d. 
^
2n n n 
For a region III outcome, marginal attribute cost is sufﬁciently high in equilibrium that a positive purity 
level cannot be supported as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, 1=n þ doc0ð:Þ. A Nash equilibrium does exist 
^
in mixed strategies;12 however, we do not focus on these outcomes in the present paper and consider only 
symmetric, pure strategy Nash equilibria. 
Under monopolistic competition, the number of active ﬁrms, n� ¼ nðcb; d; t; F Þ, is determined by Eqs. (15) 
and (16) and free-entry condition (17). 
To develop some insight on the three regions of production, consider Fig. 1. Fig. 1 considers the case of 
rð1 � Þ � dð1 � rÞ � t =nÞ (17).g g g 
~~
~~green technology with constant unit cost, cd þ c where c denotes marginal attribute cost for the green product 
and depicts outcomes under symmetric oligopoly in ðd; cÞ-space. The bold 451 line ðc ¼ dÞ depicts the lower 
boundary on the cost premium that supports equilibrium fraud. For cost pairs below this line, ~cod, producing 
truly green products is less costly than disguising brown goods as green ones, and fraud never emerges. The 
dashed line at ~c ¼ 1 denotes the upper limit on marginal attribute cost given by (3). The upper triangle in the 
ﬁgure thus delineates the cost pairs encompassed by the analysis. The remaining lines divide this area into 
regions I, II, and III. The bold line at ~cb ¼ 1=n þ d represents the upper boundary on the cost premium that 
supports a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and region III is comprised of all cost pairs above this locus. The 
~c 
baseline case with no eco-certiﬁcation policy (t ¼ 0), this area is further divided into region I and region II by 
area beneath the b locus represents cost pairs that support a green market outcome in pure strategies. In the 
^12Assume a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists which satisﬁes ðy e g; reÞ ¼ ð0; 0Þ. If a ﬁrm unilaterally defects by producing green 
products, n ¼ 1, it follows by (16) that Fgo0 only if 1 � c0ð:Þo0, which contradicts condition (3). 
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Fig. 1. Equilibrium outcomes under oligopoly. 
the locus 
1 
% & 
c~f ¼ n þ 1 þ d. 
n2n
f locus and region II lies between the b and
~
f loci. From this baseline, the effect of 
c 
Region I lies below the ~~c c 
unit eco-certiﬁcation costs (t40) on the boundaries between regions is to shift upwards the
~c 
f locus to 
1 þ nt %n þ 1& c ¼ þ d.
2n n 
c 
Positive unit eco-certiﬁcation costs expand the range of marginal attribute cost that supports unit purity in 
~
cthe oligopoly equilibrium by shifting the locus upward to encompass a larger range of cost pairs. For a ~c 
representative ﬁrm with cost pairs between the fc the loci in the ﬁgure, the imposition of unit eco­~
~
~c c 
certiﬁcation costs eliminates fraud that would otherwise exist in the market equilibrium. Taxes on dirty 
c ftechniques (to0) have the opposite effect, shifting the locus downward and reducing the range of industry 
~
cost pairs that support a region I outcome. 
Under monopolistic competition, the locus 
c 
1 þ nt 
2 
n þ 1c ¼ þ d 
n n 
shifts up and pivots counterclockwise with increases in either t or F. Eco-certiﬁcation costs are generally more 
effective in deterring fraud under monopolistic competition, and this is because of the additional effect of 
policy on ﬁrm exit. The locus ~c b ¼ 1=n þ d that divides regions II and III shifts linearly upwards with an 
increase in F due to exit, but shifts downwards with an increase in f (because entry occurs in region II 
following an increase in unit certiﬁcation costs—see below). 
The effect of eco-certiﬁcation on the boundary regions of the oligopoly and monopolistically competitive 
equilibria can be summarized as follows: (i) positive unit eco-certiﬁcation costs can reduce or eliminate fraud 
in green markets; (ii) environmental taxes on brown techniques can cause fraud to emerge in green markets 
where it otherwise would not occur; and (iii) ﬁxed eco-certiﬁcation costs have no effect on behavior under 
oligopoly, but can reduce or eliminate fraud under monopolistic competition. These results are intuitive. Unit 
� 
eco-certiﬁcation costs deter fraud by reducing the marginal return to disguising brown goods as green ones, 
and ﬁxed eco-certiﬁcation costs mitigate adverse selection in industries with free entry by reducing the number 
of ﬁrms. 
The location of the cost loci depends on the industrial structure of the market as follows: 
Proposition 2. Without monitoring and enforcement, a green market: 
(i) never exists under perfect competition; 
(ii) exists with unit purity under monopoly; and 
(iii) exists under oligopoly with unit purity when % &
yg 1 þ t 
%
n þ 1&0 c o þ d
2n n n 
and with impurity when
 
1 þ t %n þ 1& 0! � " 1
 þ dpc y =n p þ d.g2n n n 
Firms face two opposing motivations to engage in green production. The production of true green goods 
can be proﬁtable, because doing so raises purity and thereby results in an outward shift in market demand. 
Nevertheless, adverse selection can drive green production away, because it is aggregate, rather than 
individual, behavior which determines market purity, and the individual ﬁrm has no leverage on what others 
will do. Under competition, the effect of an individual ﬁrm’s output on purity is negligible, and the ﬁrst effect 
disappears. Green market foreclosure occurs. Under monopoly, the effect of purity on sales of market goods is 
fully internalized, and the second effect disappears. Green markets are unit pure. Under oligopoly, both effects 
are at work, and the balance between them depends on the number of ﬁrms in the industry and on the 
marginal attribute cost of the representative ﬁrm. 
The outcome under various green market structures can be seen most clearly in Fig. 1 for the case of no 
f locus and the b locus have a unit intercept, and the entire upper policy (t ¼ 0). Under monopoly, both the ~~c c 
triangle becomes region I. With a larger number of ﬁrms, both the f b the locus shift downward, locus and ~~c c 
and, in the limit as n tends to inﬁnity, convergence occurs with the 451 line and the entire upper triangle 
becomes region III. 
Policy also affects behavior within regions. Comparative statics results for the relevant policy variables are 
presented in Table 1 for regions I and II.13 In region I, fraud does not exist in the green market, and policy-
induced changes in cost generate the familiar market effects. Under oligopoly, an increase in unit certiﬁcation 
costs reduces green output and raises prices, and an increase in ﬁxed certiﬁcation costs has no effect on output 
or prices. In the monopolistically competitive equilibrium, higher eco-certiﬁcation costs reduce green output, 
raise prices, and induce exit. 
In region II, changes in the various model parameters lead to equilibrium adjustments in both output and 
y^
by applying the implicit function theorem jointly on Eqs. (15) and (16). An increase in unit certiﬁcation costs 
elevates product purity in the green market, shifting demand to the right and raising the green market price. 
Consequently, proﬁts rise with higher eco-certiﬁcation fees. This can make voluntary eco-certiﬁcation policies 
possible, even in settings where individual reputation effects are not important. 
purity in the green market. Under oligopoly, the equilibrium output level, , and purity level, r, are obtained g
y^
y^
by Eqs. (15), (16), and entry condition (17). An increase in unit eco-certiﬁcation costs raises purity and prices, 
and this stimulates entry. An increase in ﬁxed eco-certiﬁcation costs induces exit and affects output and purity 
in the green market according to the sign of the term 
n � 1 
In the monopolistically competitive equilibrium, the free-entry equilibrium values of , r, and n are deﬁned g
o ¼ �
n g
ð 00ð:Þ1 þ rc Þ. 
13Calculations of all results are contained in an appendix which is available from the authors upon request. 
Table 1 
Comparative statics results 
Exogenous variables Endogenous variables 
Oligopoly Monopolistic competition 
y y^^g r p g r n 
Region I:
 
t � 0 � � 0 �
 
F 0 0 � � 0 �
 
n + 0 �
 
Region II:
 
t � + + � + +
 
?a ?bF 0 0 � � 
N �?c ?d 
Notes: 
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n � 1 
y^o ¼ � ð1 þ rc 00Þ. 
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"
00 
sgn � : n 
By inspection of Eq. (15), notice that o40 holds for sufﬁciently small values of rc00ð:ÞX0, for instance 
when marginal attribute cost is approximately constant or when the degree of product purity is sufﬁciently 
small. When o40, higher ﬁxed eco-certiﬁcation costs raise both output and purity in green markets. Thus, 
ﬁxed eco-certiﬁcation costs can serve as an entry barrier and, at the same time, produce pro-competitive 
effects. 
Under oligopoly, the welfare effects of eco-certiﬁcation can be examined by comparing the outcome that 
occurs in the market in Eqs. (15) and (16) to the socially optimal resource allocation in Eqs. (9), (10), and (11). 
This comparison is summarized as follows: 
Proposition 3. Under eco-certiﬁcation, a socially optimal resource allocation: 
(i) can always be obtained under monopoly; 
(ii) can never be obtained under perfect competition; and 
(iii) can be obtained under oligopoly only when 
0 � n e
# $  
0
!
� 
" ! "
bc y =n p d � y .g n � 1 n � 1 
Under oligopoly, it is conceivable to obtain the social optimum with policies that do not rely on 
monitoring and enforcement. However, because the socially optimal policy requires to0 to reconcile 
private and social output levels (i.e., a subsidy in the green market and a tax in the brown market), this 
increases the return to fraud and widens the range of cost parameters for which illicit activities occur (see 
Fig. 1). 
Welfare effects in the monopolistically competitive equilibrium can be examined by comparing the out­
come that occurs in the market in Eqs. (15), (16), and (17) to the socially optimal resource allocation in 
Eqs. (9)–(12). 
Proposition 4. A socially optimal resource allocation can be obtained under eco-certiﬁcation with free-entry only 
when 
� 0 �% n e # $  0! � �" & ybc y =n p d � .g � � 1 � � 1n n
When feasible, the optimal program involves negative unit eco-certiﬁcation fees, positive ﬁxed certiﬁcation 
fees, and generates positive revenue for the certifying agent. 
In the monopolistically competitive equilibrium, ﬁxed certiﬁcation fees can be used to control the number of 
ﬁrms, and this attenuates the common property problem. The social optimum involves a trade-off between 
diversifying production to achieve the minimum efﬁcient scale of ﬁrms and consolidating production to 
facilitate product purity in the market, and there is no guarantee that unit purity will be provided when the 
number of ﬁrms is selected to minimize industry costs. 
The main difﬁculty with using price instruments to control fraud is that purity decisions hamper policy. It 
takes a negative eco-certiﬁcation fee to increase output, whereas a positive eco-certiﬁcation fee is required to 
increase purity. This problem can be seen directly by inspection of Eqs. (15) and (16). Notice that the 
parameter t enters additively in both equations, so that it is impossible to discourage fraudulent production 
without simultaneously discouraging true green production. What is missing is an instrument to uniquely 
target fraud, for instance a unit tax on disguise.14 In the next section, we consider whether monitoring and 
enforcement activities can fulﬁll this purpose. 
5. Eco-certiﬁcation with monitoring and enforcement 
Now consider eco-certiﬁcation policy which involves independent certiﬁcation and monitoring of 
green products. To focus attention on the ability of monitoring to control fraud, suppose inspection 
does not consume resources. 15 Let aA[0,1] denote the monitoring rate selected by the inspecting agent. 
We assume a is exogenous to ﬁrms. Nonetheless, the detection rate for a given a can be endogenous. For 
example, when ﬁrms are organized in mixed operations that produce both brown and green goods 
and monitoring is done by random sampling, the conditional probability of detection depends on product 
purity.16 
Let ah(ri) denote the detection frequency of ﬁrm i, where ri is the purity level of ﬁrm i’s green products 
and h(ri) is the conditional probability of detection given that a monitoring event occurs. Two 
scenarios are considered: a benchmark case with exogenous detection, hðriÞ ¼ h¯ for all ri, and the 
case of endogenous detection, where h(ri) is assumed to be differentiable with h(0)1, h(1) ¼ 0, h0(ri)o0, and 
h00(ri)o0. 
To illustrate the nature of the detection function, ah(ri), and to show our assumptions on it to be reasonably 
natural, suppose a ﬁrm places three types of goods (yb, yg, and yf) into two types of boxes, labeled ‘‘brown’’ 
and ‘‘green’’. If a monitoring agent inspects green boxes by random sampling, the probability of ﬁnding a truly 
green good in a given box sampled from ﬁrm i is ri. With a sample size of m boxes at ﬁrm i, the detection 
mfrequency, hðriÞ ¼ 1 � r , satisﬁes each of the properties above. i 
Firms face two potential sanctions when fraud is detected: (i) fraudulent output is destroyed; and (ii) a ﬁne 
of fX0 is paid on fraudulent units. Positive ﬁnes on detected fraud may or may not be used, depending on the 
authority of the inspecting agent to collect them.17 
14It is straightforward to show that increasing disguise costs to d ¼ 1 would eliminate fraud (see Fig. 1). A subsidy in the green market 
then could be used to increase true green production to the social optimum. 
15Extension to the case of costly monitoring effort would be relatively straightforward. 
16Mixed organizations are not uncommon in green markets. In a recent study of organic producers in Ohio, 42% of fruit and vegetable 
producers identiﬁed themselves as mixed operations which produce both organic and non-organic, while 50% identiﬁed themselves as 
producing exclusively organic [21]. 
17In the USDA’s NOP standards, monitoring and certiﬁcation is accomplished by private agents, but ﬁnes (currently $10,000 per unit) 
are imposed by USDA for mislabeling products under its organic seal. 
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Suppose the certifying agent fully inspects all output whenever fraud is detected. A ﬁrm producing green 
goods to a purity standard of ri would then expect to make successful sales of 
yig ^ ¼ yig þ
#
1 � ahðriÞ
$
yif . 
¼P
The removal of detected fraudulent output from the market creates a distinction between the purity of 
goods produced and the purity of goods sold in the green market.18 The purity produced by the representative 
ﬁrm is r ¼ yg =ðyg þ yf Þa, and average purity in the market, after screening for fraud, is 
r 
y^ .iyig^The total expected quantity of goods sold in the green market is g 
r ¼ . 
1 � ahðrÞð1 � rÞ 
In the analysis to follow, it is helpful to isolate the effect of ﬁrm i’s output choice on expected detection, 
bi(ri,yif) ¼ ah(ri)yif. This is done by deﬁning the marginal detection functions, 
gif ðriÞ ¼ qbiðri; yif Þ=qyif ¼ ahðriÞ � rið1 � riÞah0ðriÞX0, 
gigðriÞ ¼ qbiðri; yif Þ=qyig ¼ ah0ðriÞð1 � riÞ2p0. 
The marginal detection functions have two important properties: The detection rate of ﬁrm i is speciﬁc to 
ﬁrm i; and a marginal increase in either yif or yig has no implications for detection when goods are unit pure, 
gif ð1Þ ¼ gicð1Þ ¼ 0. 
^
^y^ y
1 � gig. These relationships are intuitive. The effect of an individual ﬁrm’s production on market sales adjusts 
^
each unit increase in output for the change in marginal detection. For an additional unit of fraudulent output, 
the ﬁrm’s expected sales of the green good rise by less than one unit, because a higher incidence of fraud 
increases the detection rate. For an additional unit of true green output, the ﬁrm’s expected sales of the green 
^
good rise by more than one unit, because increased green production serves to launder fraud. Accordingly, the 
effect of an individual ﬁrm’s production on market purity is 
^r qr 
rð1 � gigy y
^
^
The effect of ﬁrm production on market output can be expressed as q =qyif ¼ 1 � gif and q =qyig ¼g g 
qr 
qyif 
^ 1# $
; 
$
.1 � gif 1 �¼ ¼ Þ qyigg g 
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Under monitoring and enforcement, ﬁrm i’s problem is 
y yig 
^
� #cb þ d þ ahðriÞf $yif � cbyig 
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Þ � f^ 1ð �rMax p¯b þ � cðyigÞ. 
¼ 1=n, gif ¼ gf, and gig ¼ gg, are 
g
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The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions in the symmetric case,
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where use has been made of the regulated brown price, p¯b ¼ cb þ t. Notice that (18) and (19) differ from 
Eqs. (15) and (16) only by the magnitude of ﬁnes, f, and by the gf and gg terms, which now adjust the 
equilibrium conditions to account for the effect of each type of production on anticipated market sales, market 
prices, and penalties. In expression (18), the marginal private beneﬁt of fraud is now lower than in the case 
without monitoring and enforcement (i.e., gf X0). A marginal unit of fraudulent output now increases the 
detection rate, which reduces expected marginal revenue (the ﬁrst term in Of). The marginal private cost of 
fraud is now higher, as well, because a marginal increase in fraudulent output by dyf increases the detection 
rate by dgf, and this raises the ﬁrms anticipated penalty by (cb+f)dgf (the second term in Of). In expression 
(19), true green production is now more valuable to ﬁrms than in the case where monitoring and enforcement 
do not take place (recall that ggp0). An additional unit of true green production raises expected green market 
18This raises the interesting possibility that eco-certiﬁcation activities generate covariance between monitoring effort and prices, which 
can have additional compliance implications. 
Oc =nÞp0; y Oggn � 1Þ Þ þ ð1 � ¼ 0, (19)¼ ð =n � Þ=n � g ðcb þ f Þ � cggg g g 
sales (the ﬁrst term in Og) and reduces expected penalties (the second term in Og). True green production now 
serves as well to launder fraud. 
Notice that the terms cb and f enter additively in the penalty functions. Detected fraudulent units are 
destroyed, and this has the same effect on compliance as a ﬁne. 
Consider, ﬁrst, the benchmark case of exogenous detection. In this case, hðriÞ ¼ h¯ for all ri, and it follows 
that gf ¼ ah¯ and g ¼ 0. Eqs. (18) and (19) reduce to g 
Of ¼
!
r^
!
ðn � 1Þ=n � y^
"
� t
"#
1 � ah¯$� ah¯ðcb þ f Þ � dp0; yf Of ¼ 0, (20)g 
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þ
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1 � y^
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=n � t � c 0ðr^y^ =nÞp0; y Og ¼ 0. (21)g g g g
Notice that (21) is identical to (16). With exogenous detection, the production of truthful green goods no 
longer serves to launder fraud. Monitoring and enforcement effort reduces the incentive to produce fraudulent 
goods in expression (20), but has no direct bearing on the production of green goods. Hence, both a and f 
uniquely target fraud, and the use of either variable provides the certifying agency with an independent 
instrument to control it. 
Proposition 5. With exogenous detection, a socially optimal resource allocation always can be obtained under 
eco-certiﬁcation. Fines are not necessary to support this outcome. 
With exogenous detection, the social optimum can be supported under both oligopoly and monopolistic 
competition. This can be done through the use of a brown tax (t), and various combinations of eco­
certiﬁcation fees (f and F) and monitoring effort (a). Moreover, the destruction of detected fraudulent output 
is sufﬁcient to attain full compliance. 
Now consider endogenous detection. From Eqs. (18) and (19), we have 
Proposition 6. In an eco-certiﬁcation program with endogenous detection, a socially optimal resource allocation 
cannot be obtained under perfect competition and can be obtained under oligopoly only when 
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As in the case with no monitoring activities at all, eco-certiﬁcation cannot eliminate equilibrium fraud when 
detection is endogenous, because the instruments available to the eco-certiﬁcation agent do not uniquely target 
fraud. Monitoring and enforcement deters fraud, but full compliance (r * ¼ 1) is unattainable for a range of 
attribute marginal cost. As products become increasingly pure, ﬁrms are better able to launder fraud, and the 
deterrence effect of monitoring becomes negligible. A socially optimal resource allocation is possible under 
precisely the same conditions that support such an outcome with no monitoring and enforcement at all. 
6. Concluding remarks 
Both the literature on environmental regulation and the emerging literature on eco-certiﬁcation focus on 
one of two circumstances: (i) cases where fraud does not exist; and (ii) cases where monitoring and 
enforcement actions uniquely target illicit behavior. This paper has relaxed these conditions by considering the 
linkages between policy and equilibrium fraud and between purity and detection. The analysis revealed that 
environmental policies designed to emphasize green techniques increase the extent of fraud in the economy— 
and may even cause illicit activities to emerge in markets where they otherwise would not. Eco-certiﬁcation 
policy, which raises the cost, rather than subsidizes the use of green techniques, reduces equilibrium fraud, and 
this generally produces desirable welfare effects in green markets. However, the extent to which social welfare 
can be improved through the use of eco-certiﬁcation policy depends on the sensitivity of the detection 
probability to increases in monitoring effort. 
The performance of eco-certiﬁcation policies depends on green market structure. In oligopoly markets 
where fraud does not occur, for instance due to a high cost of disguising it, unit eco-certiﬁcation costs reduce 
output and lower proﬁts per ﬁrm; however, when an element of impurity exists in the oligopoly equilibrium, 
! 
! 
positive unit eco-certiﬁcation costs deter fraud and proﬁts per ﬁrm rise in response. Eco-certiﬁcation fees can 
thus provide a proﬁt motive for voluntary certiﬁcation, even in industry settings where reputation effects are 
unimportant. 
The ﬁndings in this paper point to an interesting nexus between antitrust regulation, international 
trade, and eco-certiﬁcation policy. In markets with unit purity, policies that reduce industry concentration, 
for instance merger prevention, have desirable pro-competitive effects on output and prices. In markets 
with a degree of equilibrium fraud, however, policies that reduce industry concentration generally decrease 
both product purity and output in green markets, producing clear anti-competitive effects. Indeed, it is 
possible that conventional antitrust policies designed to facilitate market competition lead to green market 
foreclosure. 
In the international trade literature, mandatory national eco-certiﬁcation schemes are generally viewed as 
non-tariff trade barriers.19 Nevertheless, such policies can also serve a valuable role in facilitating product 
purity. National requirements that involve ﬁxed eco-certiﬁcation costs have the potential to increase global 
output (see Table 1) and can thereby promote, rather than prevent, the international trade of green products. 
It should be noted that our results rely on a uniform distribution of consumer preferences for environmental 
attributes. While a non-uniform distribution of environmental tastes would not alter the main qualitative 
results of the paper, the shape of the distribution can have important normative implications for policy. To the 
extent that our analysis has overemphasized the tails of the preference distribution, the socially optimal 
resource allocation may involve a degree of impurity in green products. Multiple equilibria are also possible 
where green markets serve those with mild preferences separately from ‘‘fanatics’’. 
An interesting possibility for future research is to examine the performance of various eco-certiﬁcation 
policies under endogenous detection. The relationship between market purity and the detection rate has 
particularly interesting implications for the design of efﬁcient monitoring programs in second-best policy 
settings. Removing detected fraudulent output from a market can generate covariance between monitoring 
frequency and market price(s), and this creates a link between compliance and the degree of randomization of 
monitoring effort. It is possible that cost-neutral changes in an inspection proﬁle that increase the variability 
of the monitoring effort, for instance through less frequent but proportionately more comprehensive 
inspections, have desirable compliance implications for the control of fraud. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1. Making use of (4) and (5), Eqs. (9)–(11) reduce to 
yb � y 0
" 
¼ cb þ e1 �!
1 �
(A.1)cðkÞ ,g " 
þ r 0
" 
� cb � e 0 ¼ rðc 0 � d � ey^
y^
Next substitute (A.1) into (A.2) and combine this expression with (A.3) to get r
^y^b � y
0 =2Xc 0 � d � e 
1 � (A.2) 
(A.3) 
cðkÞ Þ þ d,g g 
1 � .g 
y^
must be met with a strict inequality for any positive disguise cost, 0od. Hence, the social optimum involves 
r * ¼ 1. & 
19For a thorough examination of the trade effects of eco-labeling restrictions, see [9]. 
=2X � d. This condition g 
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Proof of Proposition 2. For part (i) notice that, when n-N, Ff ¼ rð1 �
y 0ð:Þ þ t. ^
0ð:Þ � dp0 for the competitive case, which contradicts. Therefore, 
y^ Þ � t � d in Eq. (15) and Fg ¼g0ð:Þ in Eq. (16). If true green output is produced, Fg 
Substitution of this into (15) yields Ff ¼ c
y^rð1 � ¼ 0, it follows that rð1 �Þ � t � c Þ ¼ cg g
true green output is not produced, attribute demand goes to zero, and it follows immediately that yf ¼ 0. 
y þ t þ dÞo0 when n ¼ 1. Hence, fraud is never optimal, and the green 
product has unit purity. It remains only to be shown that the green good is produced in the monopoly 
^For part (ii) notice that Ff ¼ �ðr g 
eequilibrium. At a unit purity level, Fg ¼ 1 � 2y � t � c0ð:Þp0 and it follows from condition (3) that y 40g g
must hold in the monopoly equilibrium. & 
Proof of Proposition 3. To obtain the social optimum, the tax must be set at the Pigovian level in the brown 
market, t� ¼ e0ðy Þ, and the value of t in Eqs. (15) and (16) must be selected to simultaneously induce unit b
purity and the social output level that solves (10). Noting that the premium price of the environmental 
* � �attribute at the optimal resource allocation (r ¼ 1) is deﬁned by p � p ¼ 1 � y , the social output level of g b g
the green good solves c0ðyg =nÞ � e0ðybÞ ¼ 1 � yg. 
The goal is to reconcile this output level with the region I output level deﬁned by Fg ¼ 0 in Eq. (16). It 
e;I �follows after some manipulation that yg ¼ yg for 
f� ¼ �
!
1 þ e 0ðy � bÞ � c 0ðy � =nÞ
" 
=n. (A.4)g 
Substitution of (A.4) and t ¼ e0ðy Þ into (15), unit purity is an equilibrium outcome when b
n e0ðy Þ 
c 0ðy � =nÞp
! "
d � b . (A.5)g n � 1 n � 1 
For part (i), notice that the inequality in Eq. (A.5) always holds for the case of n ¼ 1. For part (ii), notice 
that the inequality in Eq. (A.5) fails to hold as n-N, because c0ð:Þ4d. It remains only to show that a range of 
costs exists under which an oligopoly industry produces unit purity under the eco-certiﬁcation fee (A.4). To see 
this, deﬁne the premium marginal cost locus that meets (A.5) with equality by 
c^0 � 
! n "
d � e
0ðybÞ ðyg =nÞ ¼  . n � 1 n � 1 # $
=n. ^c d ¼ n � 1 þ e
Þ-pairs exist for which unit purity occurs under oligopoly when
^0 � 0ðyThe =nÞ locus equates with unity when To complete the proof, notice that ðy Þbg
d^o1. This implies e
holds by the feasibility condition on brown production, e0ðybÞoc0ðyg =nÞ. & 
Proof of Proposition 4. To obtain the social optimum under monopolistic competition, Eq. (A.4) and 
inequality (A.5) must be met and F must be selected to reconcile the number of ﬁrms in Eq. (17) with the 
optimal number (n *) which satisﬁes Eq. (12). Substitution of t� ¼ e0ðy Þ and f* from (A.4) into zero proﬁt b
condition (17) gives ! 
� � 
"! 
� � 2
! 
� 
"
1 þ e 0ðybÞ � c 0ðy =nÞ 1 þ ðn � 1Þc 0ðy =nÞ þ e 0ðybÞ
" 
¼ n F þ cðy =nÞ . (A.6)g g g 
At the socially optimal resource allocation, the number of ﬁrms must satisfy Eq. (12), or 
ncðy � =nÞ ¼
h 
c 0ðy � =nÞ � ðn � 1Þcb 
i!
1 � c 0ðy � =nÞ þ e 0ðy �Þ
" 
. (A.7)g g g b
Eq. (A.7) implicitly deﬁnes n *. Making use of (A.7) in Eq. (A.6), n * is also the equilibrium number of ﬁrms 
under monopolistic competition when F * is chosen as 
F� ¼
!
1 þ e 0ðyb�Þ � c 0ðy � =nÞ
"!
1 � c 0ðy � =nÞ þ e 0ðyb�Þ þ nðn � 1Þcb 
". 
n 2. (A.8)g g 
� 
! 
� �
"
The optimal policy pair (f*, F *) in Eqs. (A.4) and (A.8) together with t� ¼ e0ðybÞ reconcile outputs yb; yg 
and the number of ﬁrms (n *) with the socially optimal levels in Eqs. (9), (10), and (12). However, this outcome 
may or may not involve unit purity (r * ¼ 1) in the green market. Unit purity occurs only when y , and n * b; yg
0ð:Þ 0ðy Þo1, which ðd; c b
� 
� 
� � � � 
� � 
� � 
also satisfy inequality (A.5). It is clear by inspection of this boundary that unit purity is an equilibrium 
outcome whenever 
n * ¼ 1, whereas a range of values of the optimal premium marginal cost, c0ðy�=n�Þ, exists for which r *o1 is g 
an equilibrium outcome whenever n *41. 
In cases where the policy pair (f*, F *) and the environmental tax rate t� ¼ e0ðy Þ implement the social b
optimum, certiﬁcation revenue is given by 
f� y � þ nF� ¼ ðn � 1Þcb 
!
1 þ e 0ðy � bÞ � c 0ðy � =nÞ
" 
=n,g g 
which is positive by condition (3). & 
Proof of Proposition 5. Under oligopoly, the social optimum involves Og ¼ 0 in Eq. (21) and Ofo0 in Eq. (20). 
Eq. (21) is identical to (16), so that the socially optimal output level for the green product occurs through a 
policy that combines an environmental tax of t� ¼ e0ðy Þ with the unit eco-certiﬁcation fee given by (A.4). It b
remains only to show that a monitoring and enforcement policy can be designed to produce a green good that 
is unit pure. Noting that t * ¼ f* �t *, substitute t� ¼ e0ðy Þ, y ¼ 1 � c0ðy =nÞ þ e0ðy Þ and f* from (A.4) into b g g b
(21) to get ! 
0ðy � 0ðy � 
"#
1 � a ¯Of ¼ ðn � 1Þc =nÞ þ e Þ h
$
=n � ah¯ðcb þ f Þ � d. g b
Unit purity occurs in equilibrium when Ofo0. Clearly, this holds when ah¯o1 for sufﬁciently large levels 
of f. In particular, any monitoring frequency sufﬁces that satisﬁes 
ðn � 1Þc0ðyg =nÞ þ e0ðybÞ � nd ah¯4 . (A.9)ðn � 1Þc0ðy =nÞ þ e0ðy Þ þ nðcb þ f Þ g b
To complete the proof of feasibility under oligopoly, notice that the right-hand side of (A.9) is strictly less 
than unit value when f ¼ 0. 
Under monopolistic competition, Proposition 5 establishes that the optimal policy pair (t *, f*, F *) in 
Eqs. (A.4) and (A.8) reconcile outputs 
! 
y� b; y
� 
g 
" 
and the number of ﬁrms (n *) with the socially optimal levels in 
Eqs. (9), (10), and (12). A monitoring frequency which satisﬁes (A.9) guarantees that Ofo0 for n* ; hence unit 
purity is obtained. & 
Proof of Proposition 6. Under endogenous detection, gf ð1Þ ¼ g ð1Þ ¼ 0 at a unit purity level. Hence, (18) and g
(19) are identical to (15) and (16) at a unit purity level. & 
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